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INDIANA
LAW JOURNAL
Volume XII

APRIL, 1937

Number 4

WAS COKE RIGHT?
By MURRAY SEASONGOOD*

I am very grateful for the kind introduction of your president, and I don't know but what you are going to be in the
situation of the woman who went to her lawyer for a divorce.
The lawyer said, "You have to have some reason for this
divorce. What is the reason you want it?"
"Well," she replied, "that man, he done been over-recommended to me."
All I can say is, your president has referred to the snow
and ice, and I hope that my speech won't end your meeting
with a frost.
I have talked a number of times in Indianapolis and I am
afraid I may now be in the situation of the master of a
vessel who was examining a candidate for the position of
mate and he said, "What would you do if the wind was
blowing twenty-five miles an hour?"
"I would throw out an anchor."
"What would you do if it were blowing fifty miles an
hour?"
"I would throw out another anchor?"
"How about seventy-five?"
"I would throw out another anchor."
*Address by Hon. Murray Seasongood, of the Cincinnati Ohio Bar, delivered at the dinner of the mid-winter meeting of the Indiana State Bar
Association, at Indianapolis, January 16, 1937.
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The master said, "Where in the heck did you get all those
anchors ?"
The prospective mate said, "Where in the heck did you
get all that wind?"
We used to have a lawyer at home who would begin his
argument to the jury by saying, "I shall now briefly refer
to the facts of the case, and then give myself over to general eloquence."

I shall try to avoid doing that, but should like to propound to you the inquiry as to whether Coke was right.

I

am talking about Sir Edward Coke and asking if his statement that law is the perfection of reason is accurate.
I learned recently that that statement did not originate
with Sir Edward Coke, himself, but goes to Cicero's De
Legibus in which he said that "Law is the highest reason
implanted in nature."
I believe there are a great many things in the law that
need modernizing and that the attitude of saying that the
law is the perfection of reason is wrong in the first place.
Like the professor who could not speak of himself without
taking off his hat, if we are going to adopt an attitude that
everything is all right with the law and it is the perfection
of reason, nothing will be modified and improved. But, on
the contrary in this era of change, there is a great deal that
should be modernized and improved.
Of course, Coke wasn't himself the perfection of reason.
He was a curious contradiction, having many great qualities
besides his remarkable intellect, and many that were not so
desirable.
You probably know of his quarrels with Bacon, "the
brightest, meanest, wisest of mankind." Here were two of
the wonderful intellects of that time who hated each other
with bitter hatred. They aspired to the hand of the same
lady. Bacon said of Coke that there were seven objections
to him, himself and his six children. Nevertheless this lady
succumbed to his offers of marriage, and the two men hated
each other for that and other reasons, all through their lives.
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Of course, Coke was a very great and profound lawyer.
He established the rule in Shelley's case, for which I don't
know whether we should be grateful or otherwise to him.
When it came his turn, he prosecuted Bacon with a great
deal of keen enjoyment for taking bribes. The statement
at the time was that "the Coke (they pronounced it 'Cook')
was too hot for the Bacon."
In the case of Sir Walter Raleigh-if you read of those
trials, you will be shocked at the way he conducted the prosecution against Raleigh-called him "Thou", which seems to
have been a terrible method of addressing a person in those
days-a very insulting and offensive way of speaking: "Thou
art a varlet", "Thou hast an English face, but a Spanish
heart", and words of that character. And the conviction
wasn't reversed.
On the other hand, he resisted what he thought were the
encroachments of equitable jurisdiction on the common law,
and then it was Bacon's turn to see that he was relieved of
his chief justiceship, which, of course, Bacon was very happy
to accomplish.
However, on one occasion at least Coke showed himself
to be very heroic. That was when King James I wanted to
submit a case in advance to the judges, a case that affected
the crown, and hoped to get their favorable opinion in advance, and Coke was the only one of the justices who refused
to give any opinion and said to the King, "I will decide this
case when it comes before me as beseemeth a judge, according to right and justice."
So, as I say, he was himself a queer kind of mixture of
unreasonableness and reasonableness, and his ecomiums on
the common law are to be taken having that in consideration.
I don't know how many of you have read Mr. A. B. Herbert's little booklets. One of them is called "Uncommon
Law", and one is called "Misleading Cases". They are
humorous takeoffs on the procedure in the English courts,
and in one he refers to "common sense versus common law".
I don't think that-that is quite just, but there always has
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been and still persists, to some extent, a good deal of formalism and legalism in the law which make it especially lacking
in adaptation to modern conditions.
It was not until 1898 that a person could testify on his
own behalf in England. Indeed there was a long period when
the accused was not entitled to have counsel in the case.
The idea was that if a person could not testify it was a
supposed benevolent protection to that person, because otherwise he might commit himself or say something which would
lead to proof of his guilt. It is strange how lawyers went
on for years and years, and liberty loving people went on
for years and years, carrying on those traditions and allowing
them to be rooted out very slowly indeed.
This legalism and formalism in the law was evidenced,
for instance, in the case of Thomas A. Becket. Quo warranto, of course, is an action to oust a person from some
office he is usurping-and Henry VIII, several hundred years
after Thomas A. Becket has been murdered, had an action
in quo warranto brought against him for usurping the office
of a saint. He was found guilty and his bones were disinterred and scattered about, in execution of the sentence.
I must tell you gentlemen, in case you think that is a
very old thing, what happened in our Ohio courts, just recently. A county treasurer had the misfortune to have
$5,000 stolen from one of his subordinates, who was negligent, and it was stolen under circumstances that would have
amounted to burglary if it had happened in the night season,
a breaking and entering into one of the cages where the money
was kept. We have a statute in Ohio which allows the county
commissioners, if they find the treasurer not to have been
negligent himself to exonerate him from the strict liability
of the common law (which makes him answerable absolutely
for the money entrusted to him, except only for act of God
or the public enemy) in cases of robbery, burglary, fire or
failure of a bank. We have no common law crimes in Ohio.
I don't know if that is true in Indiana or not. All crimes with
us are statutory. In the statutes they don't use the word
burglary; simply say whoever enters in the night season with
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intent, etc., shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for 20
years or life, whatever the penalty is, without using the word
burglary. Our Court of Appeals decided that this statute
did not cover this loss because it happened in the day time.
Burglary could only, according to common law, be of an
inhabited dwelling house in the night season.
Now, that seems to me to be an example of an archaic
interpretation of law. Here was a remedial statute intended to cover this thing. And burglary at common law
must not only occur in the night season; it has to be an
inhabited dwelling house or mansion house, as called in Blackstone, the only exception being, as Blackstone quaintly observes, a church, which is the mansion house of God, so
that is an inhabited dwelling house, also.
Our court took the view that it had to be in the night
season, and obviously as a county treasurer does not keep
his money in his own dwelling house, it could not have meant
that; yet by process of legalism, this unfortunate gentleman
was obliged to pay this $5,000, and in this case our Supreme
Court refused to take it on the ground of general importance.
It seems to me what courts very often are apt to do is to
overlook that maxim of the law: Cessante ratione legis cessat
ipsa lex.
I was mentioning to your president not so long ago that
I was condemned for my sins to be special counsel for the
City of Cincinnati in a gas rate controversy, and I was for
some time before the Public Utilities Commission in Columbus. There was one thing that the chairman of the Commission and I agreed about, that was an inscription, Dum
loquor tempus fugit. I said, "Freely translated, it might be
'Dumb speaking takes up time' ".
But this formula that you must analyze the reason of a
rule of the common law and see whether it is applicable to
modern conditions, is one which is applied very helpfully in
a number of recent instances.
One to which I refer especially is the case of Grosjean
against the lmerican Press Company, reported in 297 U. S.
233 and decided in 1936, which was the case arising out of
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the Huey Long affairs in Louisiana. He tried to tax the
press out of existence for opposing him. The holding in
that case was that you are not to take the common law of
England absolutely as it was. Of course, there is nothing
particularly new in that, but another application of it. It
can only be taken in so far as it is applicable and suitable
to our conditions, and the common law of England that
there was at first a censorship before publication and then
a censorship after publication which led, of course, to Milton's
great outburst, his "Areopagitica", or the right to tax to
suppress information was never applicable to our conditions,
and could never be applied and it was regarded as utterly
unsuitable.
Another case which is very heartening is the case of Funk
vs. U. S., reported in 290 U. S. 371 (1933). That case decided the old common law rule that a wife could not testify
in behalf of her husband in a criminal case was not suitable
in our United States. They reversed the conviction to let
the wife testify.
You remember the old rule was partially based on the
idea that what the wife did in the presence of her husband
she did under compulsion, which led Mr. Bumble, in Oliver
Twist, to say that "if the law presumes what the wife does
in the presence of her husband she does under compulsion,
the law is an ass and a bachelor."
Well, at all events, this is a very excellent opinion. No
doubt you have read it, but won't mind my referring to it.
It was written, I think, by Mr. Justice Sutherland and he
says the reason for this old rule has disappeared, the accused can testify himself, and, of course, he is the one who
has the most interest in the outcome. If he is allowed to
testify, anybody else ought to be allowed to testify, with
such comment about his interest as appears to be proper and
to be taken into account by. the jury.
I think that is an interesting development. But here is
a question put in that case, "Why don't you wait for Congress to pass a law and say it is all right for the wife to
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testify in behalf of her husband in criminal cases?" Mr.
Justice Sutherland said, in substance, "We can't wait that
long. We say this is not applicable to modern conditions,
and not being applicable, we repeal it, and say she may
testify."
Of course, a question arises from the rule of stare decisis,
which is an integral part of the common law, if you are going
to adhere to the rule of stare decisis. Should you reach the
conclusion that any established decision may become unsuitable to modern conditions and overrule it for that reason, that
is an interesting deviation, and the rule of stare decisis may
be affected by that type of reasoning. But the proposition
seems to me indisputable that you can't have old conditions
and the dead hand of the past hamper you without making
your law a thing unsuitable entirely to the needs of modern
life.
It is somewhat astonishing to me that Mr. Justice Cardozo
only concurred in the result in that case, and Mr. Justice
McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler dissented from the holding in the Funk case.
Another case that seems to me to be of interest in that
connection is a federal case decided in July, 1936, Hinman
vs. the Pacific Transport Company, 84 Fed. (2d) 755, and
involving the old question whether, as we learned, you own
property up to the heavens and down to the reverse, or as
more elegantly stated, to the center of the earth. The question arose as to whether a man had a right of action against
a flying company which permitted airplanes to fly one hundred fifty feet above his land or in some instances to glide
within ten feet of it, and he complained he owned the air
above his land and this was a continuing trespass.
The court said, in effect, "Where is the sky? Keep going
up and you won't reach it. How far up do you want to own?"
They reached the conclusion that that old maxim was subject to modification under present circumstances, that you
had only a general and very vague right to the air above
your property and only if you showed some necessary use
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for it, and only on real interference could there be any cause
of action resulting from it.
There is still another interesting case, along those lines,
the one recently decided in 1936, Ninth Bank & Trust Company vs. U. S., 15 F. Supp. 951. One of Coke's adages
was that there was a possibility of issue if both parents were
as old as a hundred years of age. This court, in a tax case,
reached the conclusion that where there were women involved who were fifty-seven and sixty-three, that adage was
not applicable, and would not apply in a tax case, and although
the estate was left for life to a particular person and then to
his descendants that the estate had vested in a charity which
was the residuary devisee.
Of course, your court in Indiana has rendered decisions
(and one of these is cited in the Funk case) that seem to be
admirably reasoned, if I may say so. That is this case of
Ketelson vs. Stilz, 184 Indiana 702, decided in 1916.
One of the things I have always rebelled against in the
law is this idea that if you take judgment against one tortfeasor or elect to proceed against one tort-feasor, and don't
succeed in recovering anything but a judgment, you are still
barred by your election and can't proceed against the other
tort-feasor, or you can't settle partially with one tort-feasor
and proceed against the other tort-feasor.
Your court laid down the rule it is only satisfaction of
the judgment against one tort-feasor that bars. Short of
satisfaction for injury, why should you invoke this ritualism
that pursuing one tort-feasor lets the other tort-feasor escape
unharmed?
We have had that go so far in Ohio that where a man
was injured in an automobile accident and settled with the
man who caused the accident, and later thought he had a case
against a physician who mistreated him for his injuries, for
malpractice, the physician was joint tort-feasor with the automobile driver who caused the injury, and could not be sued.
We have this technical distinction in Ohio. I trust you
don't have it here. It is all right if you take a covenant not
to sue, if you want to settle with one tort-feasor and not
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sue him, if you want to go against other tort-feasor; but
if you don't know law and want to release one tort-feasor
without releasing the other, you can't.
Coming back to your Indiana decisions again, you have
one which also commends itself very much to me; that is
Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland vs. Brucker, decided in 1933, 183 N. E. 688. The question there was
whether the state has a preference in connection with public
moneys deposited in an insolvent bank, and whether the surety
company that pays for the state is subrogated to the rights
of the state.
Now, there is a very well reasoned decision in which your
Supreme Court says that the English Common law priority
of the sovereign is unsuitable to Indiana. The court mentioned the fact that the Bank of England wasn't established
until 1694, and there wasn't any occasion for the King to
put his money in any particular bank that might become insolvent, and certainly not to put his money in to get interest
on it. Whatever prerogative the King of England may have
had, the sovereign in the State of Indiana is the people. There
isn't any right of priority as far as it relates to the sovereign
or the state in the moneys which they have placed in this
insolvent bank for the purpose of getting interest, and so
the court need not determine whether the surety would be
subrogated to the rights that are owned by the state.
Those, as I say, seem to be very forward-looking decisions
and correct rulings and the proper method of approach to
these problems.
Mr. Langdell, who had just retired from the Harvard Law
School, when I went there, used to tell his class, "Now, we
have a comparatively recent case decided by Lord Hardwick
in 1754". Of course, that is all right for teaching law, but
I do say we have got to keep this thing of the law a living
thing adapted to modern conditions, if it is to go on and
serve its purpose.
Now, may I make some suggestions as to practice, I don't
know your practice here, I don't know how many of you
do. I read the advance sheets of the Northeastern Reporter,
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at least, I skim through them, and it seems to me that practice in Indiana is a very occult and cryptic affair. You have
to watch your step or you will make some terrible mistake
that will land you on the sidewalk on the back of your neck.
But I do wonder about one thing, that is if in all the
states it isn't possible to shorten the procedural instruments
that we have. I suppose you go through the same form in
a judgment as we do to make it a solemn affair, "This
cause came on to be heard," etc. Why not say, "Judgment
affirmed", or "judgment reversed"? You don't have to say
in the judgment entry, "Argued by counsel and submitted
to the court on briefs, orally, and so on."
The conclusion is, it is reversed or affirmed, and that is
enough. You don't have to have a great long summons,
citation or mandate extending greetings. Why do you want
to be greeted every time you get bad news? It doesn't lessen
the blow. Why not just send down the word, "This is reversed", or "This is affirmed"?
Then why not have a statute, instead or putting all covenants and warranties in a deed or in a lease? Why not just
have a statute that it is understood that a person by making
a deed or making a lease, covenants and warrants thus and
so, that these are written in unless they are excluded? For
the purposes of recording, typewriting, copying, etc., there
will be a simplification and lessening of expense, very much
to be desired.
I don't know how far you use the photostat and other
modern instrumentalities for recording. We had a great
struggle and I took a considerable part in getting the photostat process used in the recording of deeds. It seems to
me to be admirable. The possibilities of forgery are eliminated, you get an exact photograph of the particular deed,
you eliminate the chance of errors in copying and the recordation is as indestructible as the paper on which it is
written. And of course you get your copies in less than no
time (whereas it takes considerable time otherwise). The
saving of expense, again, which is another feature we should
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always be mindful of. -There is the burden of expense in
all of these things. The lessening of expenses is a material
item.
Why do we want to keep on with all this abracadabra
that we have in affidavits, "State of Ohio, County of. ss."
What does it mean? What is the sense of putting it in
affidavits? What is the sense of having affidavits at all?
You know the story of the business man who was signing a lot of papers. Someone said to him, "You had better
read those, they are statements to the bank."
He said, "Oh, are they? I thought they were just affidavits."
Why isn't it enough to say that a written statement is
the equivalent of a sworn statement? Why do you have
to go before a notary and swear to it, and give the notary
40c or whatever the fee is for saying, "I swear", etc?
Another suggestion I should like to make is use of the
mail for the service of process. You don't have to have
driving or riding deputies any more, the way you used to
have in England. You have a perfectly good instrumentality
in the mails. Why shouldn't all process be served by mail,
which would probably be a public saving running into the
hundreds of thousands of dollars in a state. We have a
statute in Ohio which permits it, but it is honored more in
the breach than in the observance, except in Cleveland where
they serve all of their summons and other process in the
municipal court through ordinary mails. Cleveland has a
large foreign population and a shifting population, and they
have used that without any difficulty in their municipal court.
I think the modernization of these things is an essential
we must come to.
Many of us are like a friend I have in Cincinnati who
is fond of technicalities. He said, "Whenever a case gets
to the merits, I lose interest in it." I am afraid we are
all a little that way.
Now, take these things: maybe they have no application
to your state, but you will pardon me anyway, where both
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sides make a motion for instruction, that takes it away from

the jury and lodges it with the court; but, certainly in the
Federal courts, if you know how to do it, if you say, I

move for instruction, but if that is overruled, I want to
go to the jury, then you save your opportunity to go to
the jury.
Well, all those things seem to me to be unjust advantages,
if you do it the right way, or unjust traps if the wrong way.
We have these technical pitfalls and, I suppose, are not
always above taking advantage of them. Is this right, when
we consider the law is an effort to obtain justice to the parties, irrespective of technicalities?
We have recently passed a statute in Ohio saying that
no exception is necessary, even to the charge. That is nice
for the lawyers. I think you will agree it is a little painful
to be excepting, especially painful to stand up in the presence
of the jury as our Federal courts make you do and take
your specific objections to everything you want to except to.
I am afraid I have not been above saying, on occasion, "I
have no exception to take, your Honor". That does give
the jury the idea if one fellow takes a lot of exceptions,
and the other says, "I am perfectly satisfied with the charge",
evidently the judge is charging in favor of that one who is
entirely satisfied. I don't know why they can't let the jury
go out of the room when you take your exceptions. It is
no affair of theirs. I suppose it is for the protection of the
court, so you won't take so many exceptions as to infuriate
the jury.
Another thing, what is the need for terms of court? Why
not abolish them? Just snares for the unwary. What is
the use to have to file a motion for a new trial within three
days, but within the same term of court, and if some fellow
doesn't remember that statute and says, "I have three days
to file a motion for new trial", and some new term has
intervened, he is simply out of luck.
Of course, the difficulty with the new term also is the
court loses jurisdiction over the case when the term is ended.
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Why shouldn't the court retain his jurisdiction until the appeal
is perfected?
Suppose the court can't allow a bill of exceptions after
the term is out. The most flagrant case of technical continuation of this old common law stuff that I have been
talking about arose and is reported in Ohl & Company vs.
Smith Iron Works, in 288 U. S. 170. In that case, the federal judge, Lowell, had signed a bill of exceptions, J.A.L.
(those were his initials) D. J., and in the Court of Appeals
it was moved to dismiss the case on the ground there was
no bill of exceptions, that the signing by initial didn't constitute a signing, and that as the signing was void and the
term had gone by, they couldn't send it back to have the
bill of exceptions or signature corrected. The court decided
that it was void, and not merely an error, but completely
void and, therefore, the court had lost jurisdiction and that
person was oiut, because the judge signed J. A. L.-D. J.
Fortunately, it got into the Supreme Court of the United
States, and Chief Justice Hughes wrote the opinion and was
obliged to distinguish a former decision of that Supreme
Court in which it had held a signing by initials was not a
signature. In the Court of Appeals this Judge Lowell had
confessed his ignorance, which was, of course, a very rare
thing for a judge to do. I mean those were his exact words,
"his ignorance"-awfully decent of him. He said that the
trial lawyer had left the bill of exceptions with him and he
told the lawyer he was going to sign it; that he put on his
initials after the lawyer left, and if there was any fault in
it, it was his fault and not the lawyer's. The clerk of the
court filed a certificate to the same effect, and that it had
been the practice from time immemorial. Yet the Court
of Appeals held there was no bill of exceptions because the
signing by initial didn't amount to a signature by the trial
judge.
Well, Chief Justice Hughes was confronted with this
opinion of theirs, of about 50 years ago, where a judge signed
by initials, and it was held there was no bill of exceptions.
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He rightly thought that kind of thing was obsolete, and
that he ought nbt to allow it. Therefore he distinguished
that case on the ground that the judge there had not signed
also DJ, District Judge, and that made it entirely different.
He allowed the bill of exceptions and said it doesn't have
to be sent back to be signed. This was enough of a signature; we don't commend the practice of signing by initials,
but say it is sufficient.
I hope you don't think by now I am like that person who
couldn't make his speech immortal so decided to make it
eternal.
When I was in London some years ago we went to the
Central Criminal Court. We went as spectators, I may
say, because the general courts were not yet open. One of
the under-sheriffs, Mr. Under-Sheriff Deighton, very kindly
showed us about. First of all he showed us on the bench
a son of Charles Dickens, Mr. Common Serjeant Henry
Fielding Dickens, a little wizened old man. It seemed to
me most interesting that here was a judge who was sitting
at a time when all the things of which his father had complained in Bleak House, Mr. Tulkinghorn, and all those delays
in chancery, had all been swept away.
Then he took us also into another room and showed us
a judge who held a little nosegay up to his nose, and also
on the floor there were herbs. He said, "You know what
that is for? That is a survival of the great plague, which
was in 1668 or thereabouts, and the judges were given these
nosegays to hold to their noses to ward off infection. These
herbs were thought to have medicinal value and were strewn
on the floor for the same purpose. We have done that
ever since. During the war flowers were very expensive,
and it was a temptation to do away with this custom, but
we decided to adhere to the custom."
I think that is interesting when you consider they have
preserved the old forms and ceremonies of law, but when
it comes to procedure and improvements in the procedure,
they are far in advance of us,.having brushed away all this
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mossy stuff in their Judicature Act of 1875, and they have
made their procedure speedy and free from technicalities
of any sort.
I should like to suggest one or two more anomalies that
rankle me. These things are impersonal with me. When
I first started to practice law I couldn't sleep at night when
I thought of injustices. One of the compensations of increasing age and one of its disadvantages at the same time,
is accepting injustice. I sleep pretty well now, but nevertheless I put forward these ideas thinking that maybe some
time somebody will resolve these things ought not to be
that way.
I don't like this doctrine of contributory negligence; that
is to say, in its present form. It seems to me unjust that
a person who is contributorily negligent, no matter to how
slight an extent, if his negligence proximately causes or results in the injuries, is not entitled to recover. I don't
think that is just; that isn't the admiralty rule. The admiralty rule is that you apportion the fault and damages are
based upon the comparative fault of the respective parties.
There is a statute to that effect in 502 Hemingway's Code
in Mississippi, and the statutes relating to interstate carriers,
the several employers liability acts (45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 51)
are like that also. They apportion the fault of the respective
parties. Another thing that seems admirable in that law, if
there is a violation of statute which is negligence, per se,
you can't plead contributory negligence in that case or assumption of the risk. (Secs. 53 and 54.) Those seem to
me modern statutes and appropriate to conditions as we
see them.
I don't know whether you are sufficiently enlightened in
your state to allow in cases of condemnation of property
for the recovery for expenses as well. With us if your property is condemned, you don't get the value of your property
because you can't really get the value of your property unless
you employ a lawyer to represent you and experts to testify
on values and the compensation to both of them is not allowed
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in the recovery. Why not be fair about it? If you are
going to take a man's property, let him out whole and let
him get his necessary expenses as well as the value of his
property.
I have been attempting to teach, for a number of years,
the subject of Municipal Corporations, in which I am greatly
interested, and I have an article which I venture to ask
you to read. I don't want to be like Disraeli, who used to
say, "Whenever I want to read a good book, I write one".
This article is in 22 Virginia Law Review, June, 1936, p.
910, and in it I attack the distinction between proprietary
and governmental functon, which has spread, not alone in
the realm of tort but into questions of taxation and numerous
other controversies where it has no part. Why not simplify the whole business and say a modern municipality is a
public business corporation and ought to have the same rights
and duties and liabilities as a private corporation? They
have approached very nearly that in England in variety of
services performed by cities, and they have approached it
to some extent in Oklahoma. They engage in all kinds of
business occupation. Why should you have this old rule that
the king can do no wrong, which seems to be especially
inappropriate in the light of recent events?
Why, I say, should you have so utterly unsuitable and
archaic and obsolete a notion, which allows a man, in case
his skull happens to be cracked by negligence in operating
a street railway owned by the city, to have a money recovery,
but if he has the misfortune to get hit by a garbage truck
(I suppose the law is the same in Indiana) he can't recover
because the city is proceeding in a governmental capacity,
and is not liable because the king can do no wrong?
I suggest abolition of the grand jury. Perhaps you will
call me a radical. People used to say, "What should we
call you after you get out of office?" I said, "I was called
so many things while I was in office, I don't care what you
call me now."
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So, at the risk of being too radical, I still don't think
the grand jury is of any particular use. I think it has been
largely abolished in England. It is enough if the prosecuting
attorney wants to take the responsibility of indictment. It
comes up to him anyway and I think that is a survival that
should not longer survive.
I like the thing they have in England, of also allowing
the Court of Criminal Appeal not merely to reverse, which
gives all the advantage to the criminal, but makes him take
a sporting chance whenever he takes an appeal. When you
appeal from a criminal conviction in England you run the
risk that your sentence may be increased instead of decreased.
It is optional with the court whether it will set aside the
conviction, affirm or lessen or actually increase the sentence.
That has a very excellent tendency to keep people from prosecuting appeals after a conviction for the purposes of delay.
I think charitable institutions should be liable as other
corporations are. With us, and I suppose with you, they
are liable only in the selection of their employees, and not
for negligence of their employees. I think that is a rule
that could be well laid aside as unsuitable to actual conditions.
If a man is giving for purposes of charity, he ought to want
to do as much for a person injured by the negligence of
someone as for the sick or others who are the objects of
his benevolence.
Another thing, I should like to see more recognition in
the law of aesthetics. You have one of the landmark cases
here, that General Outdoor ldvertising case vs. The City of
Indianapolis, decided in 1930, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N. E. 309,
which I have in my case book as a standard case on the
recognition of aesthetics as a proper subject of legal protection. I regret to say that our court in Ohio is a standpat
court. W~ondrack vs. Kelley, (35) 129 Ohio St. 268. It is
easy to say aesthetics is not a subject of legal protection. It
is too intangible to know what is pretty and what isn't; in
other words, a person can have legal redress where the injury
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is to the nose or ear, but not to the eye by something that
is ugly. But I assert aesthetics should be and, increasingly,
will be a subject of legal protection.
I won't go into other things I have in mind except one.
It would take too long to mention them all-but I do think
that Lord Wright wrote a very interesting article which
appears in, I think, the June, 1936, number of the Harvard
Law Review, raising the question whether it might not be
desirable to do away with the whole doctrine of consideration
as necessary in contracts.
Of course, that leads to any number of inquiries, doesn't
it? What is a consideration? Under what circumstances
is there consideration, and all of that? Why not cut the
Gordian knot? Why not decide the matter and say whenever anybody writes himself down in black and white, he
is bound by it; you don't need to go into any question of consideration? Why isn't that right? This is right morally.
Why not let law approximate the moral and say you have
it legally, and say you haven't a right to say I didn't get
any consideration for that promise?
I am afraid by this time you are being reminded of the
story about Lord Eldon. Before he became such, he was
very successful on circuit, was very much esteemed and they
used to have a kind of little mock court in which they would
have fun. On one occasion he was asked to prosecute a
man who had been on the circuit and made a long and dull
speech, and some fellow sitting in the balcony precariously
went to sleep and fell out and was killed. So they indicted
this lawyer who made. this long speech in mock court.
Under the deodand law in England, whatever killed a person, locomotive or whatever it might be, was forfeit to the
crown. Under the law of deodand you were obliged to
describe the thing that had killed the person and the value
of it.
Lord Eldon, or Scott as he then was, indicted the orator
for killing the man with a certain blunt, dull, instrument,
to-wit, a long speech, of no value.

IVdS COKE RIGHT9

265

Now, in closing, I remind you that Dickens' young man
Guppy used to write love letters without prejudice, and I
hope you will accept these scattering suggestions of mine
for the amelioration and preservation of our calling, to which
we are so dearly attached, as without prejudice and intended
to provoke discussion and thought in the hope that some
advancement in our profession, from recognizing its imperfections, may perhaps result.

